"Replication Data for: The Logic of Kidnapping in Civil War: Evidence from Colombia"
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Why do some armed groups kidnap for ransom? Despite a dramatic spike in kidnappings by political groups over the last several decades, there are scant existing explanations for why groups use this tool of coercion. Leveraging evidence from extensive interviews with former combatants from Colombia's civil war, including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN), as well as military and security personnel, I show that ransom kidnapping is used to enforce groups' protection rackets, their main source of funding. Kidnapping is both the most lucrative way to punish tax evasion, as well as an effective means of deterring future shirking. Thus, groups that tax local populations are more likely to kidnap; groups relying on external or voluntary forms of funding are less likely to take hostages. This article explains when we should see kidnapping in armed conflict, describing an underexplored way that selective violence bolsters insurgency.
为何部分武装团伙会实施绑架勒索？尽管近数十年来政治武装团伙的绑架案件数量激增，但现有研究对这类团伙为何使用这种胁迫手段的解释却寥寥无几。通过对哥伦比亚内战时期前作战人员（包括哥伦比亚革命武装力量（Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia，FARC）、民族解放军（National Liberation Army，ELN））以及军方与安保人员的大量访谈证据，本文证实绑架勒索被用于强化团伙的保护勒索业务——这正是他们的主要资金来源。绑架勒索既是惩处逃税行为收益最高的手段，也是威慑未来逃税行为的有效方式。因此，向当地民众征税的武装团伙更有可能实施绑架；而依赖外部资金或自愿性资助的团伙则极少劫持人质。本文阐释了武装冲突中绑架勒索行为的发生语境，并揭示了一种尚未得到充分探索的路径：选择性暴力如何助推叛乱活动。
