Replication Data for: Presidential Cues and the Nationalization of Congressional Rhetoric, 1973-2016

Presidents occupy a unique role as both the head of the executive branch and a de-facto party leader. They nationalize politics and polarize lawmaking. Members of Congress know this, and they leverage the president's symbolic power to heighten political conflict. I argue that lawmakers, particularly those in the non-presidential party, invoke the president to nationalize legislative debate and polarize constituent opinion. Using the text of House and Senate floor speeches between 1973-2016 and a within-member panel design, I find that legislators reference the president more frequently in the out-party, and increasingly so as a district's media environment becomes more nationalized. Presidential references are also moderated by constituency partisanship. I support the behavioral implications with a vignette experiment: when a Republican Senator invokes President Biden in a policy speech, Republican respondents increase approval of that Senator and oppose political compromise. This research highlights the institutional consequences of nationalization and negative partisanship.总统兼具行政部门首脑与事实上的政党领袖双重独特身份。他们推动政治全国化，并加剧立法极化。国会议员深谙此道，会利用总统的符号性权力来激化政治冲突。本文主张，议员——尤其是非执政党议员——会援引总统议题，以推动立法辩论全国化并极化选民的政治立场。本文借助1973年至2016年美国众议院与参议院的议事发言文本，以及议员内部面板设计模型，研究发现：在野党议员提及总统的频率更高，且选区媒体环境的全国化程度越高，其援引总统的频次也随之增加。议员对总统的援引频次同时受选区党派倾向的调节。本文通过情景实验（vignette experiment）验证了该行为层面的推论：当共和党参议员在政策演讲中援引拜登总统时，共和党受访选民会提升对该议员的支持度，并反对政治妥协。本研究揭示了政治全国化与负面党派主义的制度性后果。