Replication Data for: Why Don't Partisans Sanction Electoral Malpractice?

Partisans rarely punish their party at the polls for violating democratic norms or cheating in elections. However, we know little about the underlying reasons. I examine why partisans rarely sanction in-party malpractice. Using preregistered survey experiments in Denmark and Mexico, I examine the different steps in how partisans adjust their views in response to revelations of electoral malpractice and distinguish between two substantively different explanations. Do pervasive biases prevent partisans from viewing in-party malpractice as illegitimate? Or do partisans accurately update their views when learning about malpractice but refrain from voting against their party? The analysis demonstrates that partisans do not apply double standards when evaluating malpractice. However, although partisans punish in-party malpractice, they hold opposing parties in such low esteem that even revelations of malpractice do not change their minds. These findings contribute to our understanding of how partisans think about electoral malpractice and political malfeasance more broadly.党派支持者极少会在选举投票中因己方政党违反民主规范或在选举中舞弊而惩罚其政党。然而，学界对其背后的深层成因尚知之甚少。本研究旨在探究党派支持者极少制裁己方政党舞弊行为的原因。借助在丹麦与墨西哥开展的预注册调查实验（preregistered survey experiments），本研究剖析了党派支持者在获悉选举舞弊相关爆料后调整自身观点的完整过程，并区分了两种本质迥异的解释路径：究竟是普遍存在的偏见令党派支持者无法将己方政党的舞弊行为视作不正当之举？还是说党派支持者在获悉舞弊情况后能够恰当地更新自身观点，但却不愿投票反对自己支持的政党？分析结果表明，党派支持者在评判舞弊行为时并未采用双重标准。不过，尽管党派支持者会惩罚己方政党的舞弊行为，但他们对反对党的评价极低，以至于即便获悉其舞弊爆料，也不会改变自身立场。本研究结果有助于学界更全面地理解党派支持者对选举舞弊及广义上政治渎职行为的认知逻辑。