Replication Data for: Tax Farming Redux: Experimental Evidence on Performance Pay for Tax Collectors

Performance pay for tax collectors has the potential to raise revenues, but might come at a cost if it increases the bargaining power of tax collectors vis-à-vis taxpayers. We report the first large-scale field experiment on these issues, where we experimentally allocated 482 property tax units in Punjab, Pakistan, into one of three performance pay schemes or a control. After two years, incentivized units had 9.4 log points higher revenue than controls, which translates to a 46% higher growth rate. The scheme that rewarded purely on revenue did best, increasing revenue by 12.9 log points (64% higher growth rate), with little penalty for customer satisfaction and assessment accuracy compared to the two other schemes that explicitly also rewarded these dimensions. The revenue gains accrue from a small number of properties becoming taxed at their true value, which is substantially more than they had been taxed at previously. The majority of properties in incentivized areas in fact pay no more taxes, but instead report higher bribes. The results are consistent with a collusive setting in which performance pay increases collectors’ bargaining power over taxpayers, who have to either pay higher bribes to avoid being reassessed or pay substantially higher taxes if collusion breaks down.对税务征管人员实施绩效薪酬，理论上有望提升税收收入，但如果此举增强了征管人员相对于纳税人的议价能力，则可能带来相应成本。本文报告了针对该问题的首个大规模田野实验：我们将巴基斯坦旁遮普省的482个房产税征管单元，随机分配至三种绩效薪酬方案组或对照组。两年后，实施激励方案的征管单元的税收收入较对照组高出9.4个对数点，对应增长率提升46%。其中仅以收入为考核指标的方案效果最佳，税收收入提升12.9个对数点（增长率提升64%），且相较于另外两项同时明确考核客户满意度与评估准确性的方案，该方案在这两项维度上几乎未出现负面影响。税收收入的增长源自少数房产按真实价值计税——这一计税标准远高于此前的实际计税水平。而受激励区域内的多数房产实际上并未多缴税款，反而报告了更高的贿赂支出。本研究结果契合合谋情境：绩效薪酬增强了征管人员相较于纳税人的议价能力，纳税人要么通过支付更高贿赂以避免被重新计税，要么在合谋破裂时不得不缴纳大幅提升的税款。