Replication Data for: Stalling the state: How digital platforms contribute to and profit from delays in the enforcement and adoption of regulations

While it is often claimed that the pace of digital transformation is such that its own, often glacial changes do not allow the state to catch up, we argue that technological companies, with the help of some state actors, have been slowing the state down. To capture this phenomenon, we introduce the notion of stalling strategies. We argue that stalling strategies have allowed digital platforms to create time that they have spent generating revenue and accumulating platform power, which later protected them from state actions. Drawing on a case study of Uber in Poland and a number of shadow cases, we distinguish five stalling strategies: reinventing classifications, stealing the time of street-level bureaucrats, dragging out court proceedings, delaying new regulations, and taking time to (not) comply. By analyzing stalling strategies, this article contributes to discussions about the politics of platform capitalism, the temporality of digitalization, and institutional drift.尽管学界常有论调称，数字化转型的节奏之快，以至于其自身往往如冰川般缓慢的变革反倒令国家监管机构难以追赶，但本文认为，科技企业在部分国家行为体的协助下，实则一直在拖慢国家监管的推进步伐。为刻画这一现象，本文提出“拖延策略”（stalling strategies）这一核心概念。本文认为，拖延策略使得数字平台得以争取宝贵时间，用于创收与积累平台势力，而这些时间随后成为其抵御国家监管行动的重要屏障。本文基于波兰优步（Uber）的案例研究与若干隐性案例，归纳出五类拖延策略：重构分类标准、占用街头官僚（street-level bureaucrats）的工作时间、拖延司法程序、延缓新监管规则的出台，以及花费时间（拒不）合规。通过对拖延策略的系统分析，本文为平台资本主义的政治逻辑、数字化的时间性以及制度漂移（institutional drift）相关议题的学术讨论贡献了新的研究视角。