Data and Code for "Hurricanes, Climate Change Policies, and Electoral Accountability"

This is the data and code accompanying the article "Hurricanes, Climate Change Policies, and Electoral Accountability", by Stefano Gagliarducci, M. Daniele Paserman and Eleonora Patacchini, in American Economic Journal: Applied Economics.<br>Article abstract: This paper studies the conditions under which legislators promote policies that may be unpopular in the short term but yield long-term benefits. Using data on the universe of federal disaster declarations from 1989 to 2020, we document that representatives from congressional districts impacted by hurricanes are more inclined to support environmental legislation addressing climate change. However, this response depends on political circumstances: only those in safe seats can change their political agenda towards policies that involve short-term costs for long-term gains. These results highlight the role of electoral incentives in shaping politicians’ attitudes towards far sighted policy making.<br><br>