Replication Data for: Question of Timing: Pre-Electoral Coalitions in Multiparty Presidential Regimes

This paper focuses on the timing of coalition formation under presidential systems. While elections in parliamentary regimes have recently been characterized by a high degree of uncertainty both in the results and the formation of cabinets, this is not the case for presidential politics. As a result, we argue that coalition cycles differ across systems of government. As a matter of fact, we argue that the process of coalition formation under presidentialism is more complicated. To test our claim, we look at forty-four multiparty governments in Latin America and Asia. We find that presidentialism — with its fixed mandate and its specific institutional mechanism for selecting the president — directly affects the ‘coalition life cycle’ and fosters a stronger propensity to pre-electoral agreements.本文聚焦总统制下联合政府组建的时序议题。尽管近期议会制国家的选举在选举结果与内阁组建两个维度均呈现高度不确定性，但总统制政治领域并非如此。据此，我们主张不同政体下的联合政府周期存在差异。事实上，我们进一步提出，总统制下的联合政府组建流程更为复杂。为验证上述论点，我们选取拉丁美洲与亚洲的44个多党联合政府作为研究样本。研究结果表明，总统制凭借其固定任期与专属的总统选举制度机制，直接影响联合政府生命周期，并强化了政党缔结选举前协议的倾向性。