Data for: Privacy concerns, voluntary disclosure of information, and unraveling: An experiment

Abstract of associated article: We study the voluntary revelation of private information in a labor-market experiment where workers can reveal their productivity at a cost. While rational revelation improves a worker׳s payoff, it imposes a negative externality on others and may trigger further revelation. Such unraveling can be observed frequently in our data although less often than predicted. Equilibrium play is more likely when subjects are predicted to conceal their productivity than when they should reveal. This tendency of under-revelation, especially of low-productivity workers, is consistent with the level-k model. A loaded frame where the private information concerns the workers׳ health status leads to less revelation than a neutral frame.关联论文摘要：本文针对一项劳动市场实验（labor-market experiment）展开研究，该实验中工人可通过付出成本自愿披露其私人生产率信息。理性的信息披露虽可提升工人自身收益，却会对其他工人产生负外部性，且可能引发后续的信息披露行为。尽管此类披露瓦解现象在实验数据中频繁出现，但其发生频率仍低于理论预测值。相较于理论上要求工人披露信息的场景，当理论预测被试应隐瞒其生产率时，被试更易达成均衡博弈。这种披露不足的倾向，尤其是低生产率工人的披露不足，与层次-k模型（level-k model）的预测结果相符。当私人信息涉及工人健康状况的具象情境框架（loaded frame）时，工人的信息披露意愿低于中性情境框架（neutral frame）下的表现。