Replication Data for: Selective Bribery: When Do Citizens Engage in Corruption?

Corruption often persists not only because public officials take bribes, but also because many citizens are willing to pay them. Yet even in countries with endemic corruption, few people always pay bribes. Why do citizens bribe in some situations but not in others? Integrating insights from both principal-agent and collective action approaches to the study of corruption, we develop and empirically evaluate an analytical framework for understanding selective bribery. Our framework reveals how citizens' motivations, costs, and risks influence their willingness to engage in corruption. A conjoint experiment conducted in Ukraine in 2020 predominantly corroborates our pre-registered predictions. By shedding light on conditions that dampen citizens' readiness to pay bribes, our findings offer insights into the types of institutional reforms that may reduce corruption and ultimately help countries to escape self-reinforcing corruption cycles.腐败现象长期存续，往往不仅源于公职人员收受贿赂，亦有众多公民主动行贿推波助澜。然而即便在腐败根深蒂固的国家，始终行贿的公民亦寥寥无几。那么，为何公民仅在部分情境下行贿，而非所有场景？本研究整合腐败研究领域中委托-代理（principal-agent）与集体行动两种分析范式的核心洞见，构建并通过实证检验了一套用于阐释选择性行贿行为的分析框架。该框架清晰揭示了公民的行贿动机、行为成本与潜在风险如何共同影响其参与腐败活动的意愿。2020年在乌克兰开展的联合实验（conjoint experiment），总体验证了我们预先注册的研究假设。本研究通过明确削弱公民行贿意愿的各类条件，为可有效遏制腐败的制度改革方向提供了理论启示，最终助力各国摆脱自我强化的腐败恶性循环。