Replication Data for: Three Essays on Political Economy of Media

This dissertation addresses the questions of what kind of political information is provided by media outlets and how media environments affect electoral politics. In my first essay, I investigate the effect of the entry of television on U.S. presidential elections from 1944 to 1964. I first show that television increases the importance of the national economy. Second, I show that television weakens the relationship between the circulation of partisan newspapers and the party vote share. In addition, I show that the crowding out of political information by television does not drive these results. I find that television is not associated with a drop in newspaper circulation and people are just as likely to read about campaigns in newspapers when television becomes available. These findings suggest that television can be a valuable source of political information. In the second essay, coauthored with Angela Fonseca Galvis and James Snyder, we study the effect of competition on media bias in the context of U.S. newspapers in the period 1870-1910. Our results indicate that partisan newspapers cover scandals involving the opposition party's politicians more intensely and cover scandals involving their own party's politicians more lightly. More importantly, we find evidence that competition decreases the degree of media bias. The point estimates suggest that compared to a newspaper in a monopoly position, a newspaper facing two competitors will on average exhibits less than 50% as much overall bias in coverage intensity. In the third essay, I study whether newspaper coverage of scandals can help voters punish the party of politicians involved in a scandal. I focus on the US House of Representatives from 1982 to 2004. I use the congruence between newspaper markets and congressional districts as a measure of newspaper coverage of scandals. I show that newspapers write more stories about representatives involved in a scandal in districts that are more congruent. I find that the parties in scandals suffer moderately in elections. More importantly, my results suggest that the parties in scandal do worse in districts/counties with higher congruence: they get fewer votes and are less likely to win.本学位论文旨在解答两大核心研究议题：媒体机构会提供何种类型的政治信息，以及媒体生态如何影响选举政治。 在我的第一篇研究论文中，我考察了1944年至1964年间美国总统选举（U.S. presidential elections）受电视普及的影响。首先，我证实电视提升了国民经济议题的受重视程度；其次，电视削弱了党派报纸发行量与政党得票率之间的关联。此外，研究表明电视对政治信息的挤出效应并非上述结果的驱动因素：我发现电视并未导致报纸发行量下降，且在电视普及后，民众阅读报纸上竞选相关内容的概率并未降低。上述研究结果表明，电视可成为颇具价值的政治信息来源。 在与安吉拉·丰塞卡·加尔维斯（Angela Fonseca Galvis）、詹姆斯·斯奈德（James Snyder）合作完成的第二篇研究论文中，我们聚焦1870年至1910年的美国报纸行业，探讨市场竞争对媒体偏见（media bias）的影响。研究结果显示，党派报纸会更密集地报道反对党政客涉及的丑闻，而对本党政客的同类丑闻报道则相对克制。更为关键的是，我们发现竞争能够降低媒体偏见的程度。点估计结果表明，与处于垄断地位的报纸相比，面临两家竞争对手的报纸，其报道倾向的整体偏差程度平均将不足原有水平的50%。 在第三篇研究论文中，我探讨了报纸对丑闻的报道能否帮助选民惩罚卷入丑闻的政客所属政党。我的研究聚焦1982年至2004年的美国众议院（U.S. House of Representatives），采用报纸市场与国会选区（congressional districts）的契合度作为衡量报纸丑闻报道程度的指标。研究结果显示，在契合度更高的选区中，报纸会就卷入丑闻的议员撰写更多报道。我发现卷入丑闻的政党在选举中会遭遇一定程度的选举损失；更为重要的是，研究结果表明，在契合度更高的选区/郡县，涉丑闻政党的表现会更差：其得票率更低，胜选概率也更低。