Replication Data for: Angling for Influence: Institutional Proliferation in Development Banking

Why do states build new international organizations (IOs) in issue areas where many institutions already exist? Prevailing theories of institutional creation emphasize their ability to resolve market failures, but adding new IOs can increase uncertainty and rule inconsistency. I argue that institutional proliferation occurs when existing IOs fail to adapt to shifts in state power. Member states expect decision-making rules to reflect their underlying power; when it does not, they demand greater influence in the organization. Subsequent bargaining over the redistribution of IO influence often fails due to credibility and information problems. As a result, under-represented states construct new organizations that provide them with greater institutional control. To test this argument, I examine the proliferation of multilateral development banks since 1944. I leverage a novel identification strategy rooted in the allocation of World Bank votes at Bretton Woods to show that the probability of institutional proliferation is higher when power is misaligned in existing institutions. My results suggest that conflict over shifts in global power contribute to the fragmentation of global governance.

为何各国会在某一议题领域已有诸多国际组织（International Organizations，IOs）的情况下，仍选择新建国际组织？主流的制度创设理论均强调国际组织具备解决市场失灵的能力，但新增国际组织往往会加剧不确定性并引发规则冲突。本文认为，当现有国际组织无法适应国家权力的变迁时，便会出现制度增殖现象。成员国期望组织的决策规则能够反映其实际权力地位；当决策规则未能匹配其权力时，它们便会要求在该组织中获得更大的话语权。随后围绕国际组织影响力再分配的谈判，往往会因信任与信息问题而陷入停滞。因此，话语权不足的国家会创设新的国际组织，以获取更大的制度控制权。为验证这一论点，本文考察了1944年以来多边开发银行（Multilateral Development Banks，MDBs）的增殖情况。本文采用一项基于布雷顿森林会议（Bretton Woods Conference）上世界银行（World Bank）投票权分配的新颖识别策略，证实了当现有国际组织内权力失衡时，制度增殖的概率会显著提升。研究结果表明，全球权力变迁引发的冲突，加剧了全球治理（Global Governance）的碎片化。