Supplementary File of "Why Climate Commitments Fail: Modelling Egocentric Governance and Incentive Misalignment under the Paris Agreement"
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This repository contains the complete set of supplementary materials for the manuscript <i>"Why Climate Commitments Fail: Modelling Egocentric Governance and Incentive Misalignment under the Paris Agreement"</i>, submitted to <i>Nature Climate Change</i>. The dataset includes simulation scripts, processed and raw outputs, strategic actor typology classifications, entropy-calibrated payoff matrices, dynamic trajectory clusters, and source-verified policy texts (NDCs and LT-LEDS from 73 countries). All materials were developed to analyse systemic incentives and typological governance behaviour under climate stress, enabling reproducible insight into short-termism, defection dynamics, and resilience thresholds.The archive includes:Cleaned semantic data from national climate commitmentsEntropy-weighted payoff structuresGame-theoretic simulation outputs in RTypology evolution visualisations and clustering logicFull methodological documentation and codebook referencesNo funding was received for this research. All files are released under a CC-BY 4.0 license for academic and non-commercial use.For detailed guidance on using the materials, refer to the included <code>README.txt</code>.



