Replication Data for: Does Youth Representation Matter for Social Spending?

Young people are underrepresented in most political institutions. While studies have investigated the causes behind the shortage of younger politicians, the potential consequences for the substantive representation of young people's interests in policy outcomes remains under-researched. I argue that younger politicians will be more likely than older politicians to allocate social spending toward child welfare for young families. Using an original dataset of over 12,000 mayoral candidates in Japan (2006-2019) and a regression discontinuity design, supplemented by interviews with 15 mayors, I find that municipalities that elect younger mayors increase spending on child welfare, especially through long-term investments in infrastructure. Mechanism tests and interviews suggest these effects stem from younger mayors' different life stages and longer time horizons rather than greater electoral incentives to court younger voters. Notably, younger mayors do not cut elderly welfare spending, suggesting youth representation can benefit young families without necessarily exacerbating intergenerational conflict over welfare.