DATA for: The Role of Payoff Parameters for Cooperation in the One-Shot Prisoner's Dilemma

Data and analysis code for Gächter, S., Lee, K, Sefton, M. and Weber, T.O. "The Role of Payoff Parameters for Cooperation in the One-Shot Prisoner's Dilemma". European Economic Review 166, July 2024, 104753, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104753 ABSTRACT: The Prisoner’s Dilemma is arguably the most important model of social dilemmas, but our knowledge about how its material payoff structure affects cooperation is incomplete. We investigate the effect of variation in material payoffs on cooperation in one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma games. We report results from three experiments (N = 1,993): in a preliminary experiment, we vary the payoffs over a large range. In our first main experiment (Study 1), we present a novel design that varies payoffs orthogonally in a within-subjects design. Our second main experiment, Study 2, investigates the orthogonal variation of payoffs in a between-subjects design. In a complementary analysis we also study the closely related payoff indices of normalized loss and gain, and the K-index. A robust finding of our experiments is that cooperation increases with the gains of mutual cooperation over mutual defection.本数据集与分析代码对应Gächter, S.、Lee, K、Sefton, M.及Weber, T.O.的论文《一次性囚徒困境（One-Shot Prisoner's Dilemma）中收益参数对合作行为的作用》，该文发表于《欧洲经济评论》（European Economic Review）2024年7月第166卷，文章编号为104753，DOI：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104753。 **摘要**：囚徒困境（Prisoner's Dilemma）无疑是社会困境研究中最为关键的模型之一，但目前学界对其物质收益结构如何影响合作行为的认知仍不全面。本研究考察了一次性囚徒困境博弈中物质收益变动对合作行为的影响，报告了三项实验的研究结果（总样本量N=1993）：预实验中，我们在较大范围内调整收益参数；第一项主实验（研究1）采用被试内设计，创新性地开展收益正交调整的实验设计；第二项主实验（研究2）则采用被试间设计，探究收益正交变动的效应。在补充分析中，我们还研究了与之密切相关的标准化损失收益指数与K指数。本实验的稳健发现显示，合作水平会随着相互合作相较于相互背叛的收益增量提升而升高。